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Price Determinants of Sulfur Dioxide Market
Abstract
The exponential increase of emissions linked to industrialization released into the air has been a
developing concern. Since the early 1960s the United States and other countries have begun recognizing
the impacts of acid precipitation, a result of emitted sulfur dioxide reacting with water molecules in the
atmosphere to produce harmful acid. Many researchers, climate policy makers, and government officials
actively tried to mitigate the origins and effects of acid precipitation, but little was accomplished the U.S.
Congress passed and President Carter signed the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980. This piece of legislation
allocated resources from the United States Government to allow a 10 year assessment of the causes and
consequences of acid precipitation with hopes of developing options for reducing known effects.
Although this was a meaningful step forward, few reform proposals have successfully negotiated the
trepid path from theory to implementation. A successful program must be realistic. The most conceivable
idea of climate reform is not about how to stop the output of SO2, but about how to control it. The SO2
allowance market, one of the most successful climate policy instruments, was put into action in 1995. By
providing economic incentives to firms with lower emissions, it effectively limited the amount of harmful
sulfur dioxide that was emitted into the atmosphere while introducing fully marketable
commodities—allowances—into the market. This paper focuses the factors that determines the price for
these allowances and discharge permits and assesses the economic impacts of this incentive program.
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Price Determinants of Sulfur Dioxide
Market
Randy Azuogu
I. Introduction
The exponential increase of emissions linked
to industrialization released into the air has been a
developing concern. Since the early 1960s the United
States and other countries have begun recognizing
the impacts of acid precipitation, a result of emitted
sulfur dioxide reacting with water molecules in the
atmosphere to produce harmful acid. Many researchers, climate policy makers, and government officials
actively tried to mitigate the origins and effects of
acid precipitation, but little was accomplished the U.S.
Congress passed and President Carter signed the Acid
Precipitation Act of 1980. This piece of legislation allocated resources from the United States Government
to allow a 10 year assessment of the causes and consequences of acid precipitation with hopes of developing
options for reducing known effects. Although this was
a meaningful step forward, few reform proposals have
successfully negotiated the trepid path from theory
to implementation. A successful program must be
realistic. The most conceivable idea of climate reform
is not about how to stop the output of SO2, but about
how to control it.
The SO2 allowance market, one of the most
successful climate policy instruments, was put into
action in 1995. By providing economic incentives to
firms with lower emissions, it effectively limited the
amount of harmful sulfur dioxide that was emitted
into the atmosphere while introducing fully marketable commodities—allowances—into the market. This
paper focuses the factors that determines the price for
these allowances and discharge permits and assesses
the economic impacts of this incentive program.
II. Literature Review
Though there is a vast amount of research on

potentially harmful compounds emitted into the air
and the economic policies that surround the management of these emissions, this paper focuses the factors
that determine the price for sulfur dioxide allowances
and discharge permits and assesses the economic
impacts of the Acid Rain Program.
The SO2 market, like many other controlled
emission markets, is a cap and trade system. In order to understand the true functionality of the SO2
market, Farber (2012) asserts that the cap and trade
program entails,
“an emissions-reduction method that sets
a rigid cap on emissions of a target pollutant for a
constellation of regulated entities but also leaves them
significant discretion to decide how to comply. An
emissions trading scheme is based on the issuance of
emission allowances… Once the pollution permits
have been initially allocated, they are transferable, and
sale prices function as free-market equivalents of pollution taxes… [And] firms can reduce its emissions to
profit by selling unneeded allowances to other present
or prospective emitters or occasionally to non-emitters entering the allowances market for speculative or
environmentalist purposes.” (pg. 8)
The merit of the cap and trade program is
within the design of the program itself, because the
cap determines the total emissions reduction, while
the trading process determines which sources reduce their emissions and to what extent. Through
the adoption of the cap and trade program, “the SO2
Emissions Trading program has reduced millions
of tons of SO2 annually at a fraction of the expected
cost” (Benkovic et al. 2001, pg 242). The prominence
of this market came in 1990, “stipulating a 10 millionton SO2 emission reduction to protect human health,
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ecosystems, visibility and materials from caused by
SO2 emissions and sulfate particles” (Benkovic et al.
2001, pg 243 ). This looming crisis inevitably initiated the process of the SO2 emissions trading program
innovation for a new way to decrease this effect by
placing a “mandatory ceiling or cap on emissions at
8.95 million tons, about a 50 percent reduction from
1980 levels” (Carlson, 1998, pg 371). This allows
large electricity-generating sources the authorization
to emit SO2 by allocation in the form of allowances
while effectively controlling the amount of SO2 in
the environment. As a result, the SO2 allowances
have been much “cheaper than originally expected
because industry found less expensive ways to reduce
emissions, saving up to one billion dollars per year in
compliance costs.” (Kumar 2010, pg. 624)
Although an extensive amount of research
has been done about the positive implications of the
Acid Rain Program, less has been done to explain
the price movements of the SO2 permit prices and
how sensitive the prices are to economic variables.
Though the fluctuations in permit price account for
supply and demand of firms, there are many other
critical indicators that play an important role as
well. Burtraw and Szambelan evidence this in their
research of the effectiveness of SO2 market in which
they highlight explanations for price movements of
permit price over time. Although they do not specify
a finite number of factors they believe play the biggest role in price determination, they underscore
a myriad of valuable signals that do. Burtraw and
Szambelan (2009) hypothesize that there are many
distinct factors within three main measures that
determine the effectiveness of the SO2 trading program. They are: environmental quality, the performance of the market, and the economic assessment
(pg. 6). In the commencement of the program, “total
emissions in 1995, the first year of the program, were
11.87 million tons—25 percent below 1990 levels
and more than 35 percent below 1980 levels” (Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg. 7). As a result, emissions
from Phase 1 were well below annual allocations of
emissions allowances to those units; yielding a bank
(surplus of permits) totaling 11.6 million allowances by the end of this phase. Henceforth, once
firms had built up a bank of unused allowances,
this created a vested self-interest of those banked
credits, which provided an opportunity to harvest

low-cost emissions reductions. In some cases, this
brought changes in operations or other innovations
into practice sooner than otherwise may have occurred. As a result, because of the excess of unused
allowances, “Phase I units reduced emissions by 57
percent, while Phase II units reduced them by 14
percent after 2000” (Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg.
7). It is argued that these emission reductions lead to
increased air quality and subsequent improvements
in public health. This outweighed both the economic
benefits from reduced emissions and the costs of the
program.
The performance of the market is inevitably
the most important measure of the program’s success. Indicators within this measure, such as volume
of trading between firms, are crucial determinants
permit prices in the SO2 allowance market. Within
the first three years of the The increased volatility
within the market created a lot of traffic, and with
the traffic came the participation of financial firms
to broker the trading of the unused allowances. By
2005, market activity had increased so much that “70
percent of allowance trading taking place between
economically unrelated firms was conducted by large
electric companies and financial firms” (Burtraw,
Szambelan, 2009, pg. 7). Burtraw and Szambelan
then observed that at the beginning of the program
“allowance prices were close to $150 per ton and fell
to about $70 per ton by early 1996… and thereafter prices rose through 2003” (Burtraw, Szambelan,
2009, pg. 9). This development and increased participation in the market derived a pivotal finding:
allowance prices began to represent the marginal cost
of abatement, which in turn is influenced by the cost
of fuels (natural gas and coal) and abatement technology. In response, the SO2 market began to reflect
the marginal cost of regulation and the higher future
value of banked allowances.
Their third measure of price determination,
economic assessment, addresses the cost savings
from the cap and trade program. One of the most
cited observations from the program is that allowance prices are significantly lower than policy makers predicted during the adoption of the program. A
reason for this is because “changes in fuel markets,
including the decline in the delivered cost of low-sulfur coal and in the price of natural gas and oil in the
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1990s, contributed to a decline in emissions” (Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg. 11). This effectively led
to a decline in the marginal cost of reduction, which
set the price for permits in the market. Furthermore,
two major studies were conducted by Carlson et al.
(2000) and Ellerman et al. (2000) to directly measure the cost savings attributable to allowance trading. They compared total costs under trading with a
hypothetical regulatory policy that only capped the
emissions and didn’t allow for trading. The findings
for both studies are highly correlated and derived
similar results that saw that cost savings under the
cap and trade program attributed about 43-55 percent more savings than under the regulatory policy
that would have only controlled the emissions cap
for each facility. These findings are substantial and
extremely telling because they provided strong evidence to back up one of original claims that policy
makers hoped the system would create technological
innovation.
It is believed that cost estimates have fallen
over time because the trading program sparked new
ways for companies to mitigate emissions at lower
costs. Burtraw and Szambelan (2009) argue strongly
that “ the flexibility under the trading program provided an impetus for investments in related markets,
such as railroads and scrubber installations, that
could not have been expected to the degree to which
it occurred with a less flexible regulator program in
place”(pg 12). One significant impact that was born
out of innovation was the concept of fuel blending. Before the allowance market, the idea of fuel
blending was thought to be infeasible; however, after
the progression of the market, “experimentation
in response to the allowance market demonstrated
that the detrimental effects of blending low-sulfur
coal with other coals were smaller than originally
thought”(Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg 13). In fact,
firms began to combine mitigation efforts, and in addition to the conception of fuel blending, companies
began to install scrubbers to achieve emissions reduction. Ellerman et al. (1997) estimated that about
half as many scrubbers as were originally anticipated
were installed during Phase I. In 1995, about 45 percent of emissions reductions came from SO2 scrubbing, with the remaining 55 percent coming from
switching to other fuels, such as low-sulfur coal. By
2001, during Phase II, Ellerman (2003) estimated

that the portion of emissions reductions attributable
to expanded use of scrubbers only fell by 8 percent to
about 37 percent.
These research efforts play pivotal roles in
the comprehension of price determinants of the SO2
market. Although this paper’s model displays slightly
different determinants for the price of permits, it
is important to note that Burtraw and Szambelan’s
three measures provide invaluable insight to price
discovery for permits. As we will see in the following empirical model, efforts to observe the most
important factors of permit price movements will
be composed of contents from price movements in
alternative fuels and substitute goods, environmental
factors, and the initial allocation of allowances.
III. Theory
For my theory section, I am going to incorporate three separate theoretical frameworks that will
help explain my research hypothesis and empirical
model.
The first theoretical framework that I will
introduce is the Theory of Price. The price theory is
an economic theory that contends that the price for
any specific good/service is the relationship between
the forces of supply and demand. The theory of price
says that the point at which the benefit gained from
those who demand a good or service meets the seller’s marginal costs is the most optimal market price.
Thus, in accordance to the SO2 market, the price at
which allowance permits will be determined should
be the point in which the demand for permits to emit
by firms who have high marginal abatement costs
is equal to the supply of permits of firms with low
marginal abatement costs. In effect, larger firms who
have high marginal mitigation costs due to the size
of their firm will look to buy permits from smaller
firms with low marginal mitigation costs and excess
permits; and that equilibrium point will determine
the price. More detail will be discussed further in my
graphical representation below.
The second theoretical framework is the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This theory is important to
the price theory because in order for the price theory
to be effective the efficient market hypothesis theory
must hold true. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is
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an investment theory that states that it is impossible
to beat the market because stock market efficiency
causes existing share prices to always incorporate
and reflect all relevant information. According to
the theory, stocks always trade at their fair value on
stock exchanges, making it impossible for investors
to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks
for inflated prices. As such, it should be impossible to
outperform the overall market through expert stock
selection or market timing, and that the only way an
investor can possibly obtain higher returns is by purchasing riskier investments (Investopedia, pg 1). This
theory has met controversial implications, due to the
evidence that some individuals do beat the market.
However, it is important to note that in a highly regulated system such as the SO2 market in which price
is determined by the supply and demand of firms
that are competing in it, firms will unintentionally
reveal their marginal cost structures either by buying
permits, selling them, or by banking them in order to
continue efficiently meeting their business standards.
The most applicable aspect of this theory to the SO2
market system is that it adds some certainty by the
participants concerning the future directions of the
market. According to the theory, participants will act
on their correct perception of the market allowing
the market to move efficiently to equilibrium.
Henceforth, to put it in graphical terms, consider Figure 1 opposite, which incorporates the two
theories of price theory and efficient market hypothesis. In this scenario, the profitability of the emissions
trading market can best be exemplified through the
market for allowance permits. In Figure 1, the supply of allowance permits is capped at Q1, meaning,
that is how many permits are available for allocation, and thus how much pollution to be emitted.
Through the intersection of the completely inelastic
total supply, which is the government limit on the
supply of permits, the ultimate effect is the resulting
quantities. Low abatement cost polluters reduces pollution down from Q1 to Q2, while High abatement
cost polluter reduces pollution down from Q1 to Q3.
Therefore, this derives new prices for both sources
and adequately derives an entirely new demand
curve for permits, thus arriving at a tradable market
for SO2. For MAChigh it is more costly to mitigate
each additional unit of emissions, so in order to meet
their production needs, they will simply adjust their

demand for permits based on the markets reactions
to demand shifters. If the price for their demand of
permits is less than or equal to their marginal cost
of abatement then they will buy the permits from
the MAClow firms because it is cheaper for them
to buy permits rather than reduce emissions. Additionally, MAClow firms are more than willing to
benefit from selling their permits because the price
for their demand of permits is greater than or equal
to their marginal cost of abatement and it will increase revenue for them. Therefore, MAClow firm’s
costs structure to mitigate emissions is lower than
the MAChigh firms and the combination of interaction between the firms develop the efficiency of the
market. It is also important to note that Figure 1 only
displays two hypothetical firms in order to make the
situation more comprehensible. In the circumstance
where many firms are involved and speculators enter
the market for environmental reasons, the newly
derived demand curves plays a much more essential
role as many factors will shift the demand for permits
positively or negatively.
Figure 1

The incorporation of the theory of price,
efficient market hypothesis, and the graphical framework for the cap and trade system all play a role in
the development of my hypothesis.
IV. Hypothesis
On the basis of the demand and supply
theories developed above, I believe there is going to
be a strong positive correlation between economic
indicators and substitutable good prices as well as a
negative correlation between environmental factors
and the inelastic supply of permits with the prices of
SO2 allowances. I believe that with shifts in these determinants, demand for SO2 permits will be affected
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and will ultimately be the deciding factor of the
overall price. I hypothesize that the business cycles,
the aggregate SO2 emission cap, natural gas prices,
overall coal prices, drought levels, and temperature
levels determine the price for SO2 allowance permits.
Henceforth, I believe that increases in prices of natural gas and coal will increase the demand for SO2
permits. Increases in unemployment, moisture and
precipitation levels (drought index), temperature,
and the SO2 cap (ceteris paribus) will decrease the
demand for SO2 permits.

most common type of coal described as black coal
that has a sulfur content weight range of .7%-4%.
Lignite coal is often referred to as brown coal that
is formed from naturally compressed heat and has a
sulfur content weight of about .4%. Anthracite coal is
a hard compact type of coal and is the least common
type of coal used for power generating containing
a sulfur content weight range of .6%-.77%. Each of
these types of coal is used in coal power plants, and I
assume that collectively, each will correlate positively
with SO2 permit prices over time.

V. Empirical Model
The data that is used in the regression is
derived from a variety of sources, as described below.
All relative prices are in real terms and are adjusted
for inflation in terms of 2005 values using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Data
frequency is monthly from August 1994 to June
2005. Graphs for the following price determinants
can be found in the Appendix.

Unemployment Rate: The civilian unemployment
rates were collected monthly from the FRED database and are used in this study to represent business
cycles over time. The overlying assumption is that
the unemployment rate will capture expansionary
or contractionary periods in the economy. This will
have a negative relationship with the prices of SO2
permits depending on the state of the economy.

Allowance Prices: Monthly SO2 allowance prices
were collected from the historical market price index
of the Cantor Environmental Brokerage and are complied from August 1994 to June 2005.
Natural Gas Prices: Monthly Natural Gas prices are
derived from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) Database and are compiled monthly from
August 1994 to June 2005. The original prices are
Henry Hub, LA average spot prices measured in
dollars per million BTU. The prices range from $1.88
per million BTU to $11.68 per million BTU with an
average of $4.58 per million BTU and are a substitute
for coal in electricity generating plants. Therefore,
Natural Gas prices are expected to correlate positively with SO2 permit prices.
Coal Prices: The regression equation includes a US
Coal Price index, CMCOALM, which provides average monthly spot prices from August 1994 to June
2005. The CMCOALM index represents the coal
prices in the industry as a whole. Power generating
plants use a variety of types of coal, but the three
most common types are Bituminous coal, Lignite
coal, and Anthracite coal as provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The significance of
each type of coal is as follows: Bituminous coal is the

Drought Index: The Palmer Severity Drought Index
(PDSI) is a measurement of dryness based on precipitation and temperature levels and attempts to measure the duration and intensity of long-term drought
inducing circulation patterns. The values of the PDSI
range from -4 to +4, with -4 being extreme drought
and +4 being extreme moisture. The significance of
the PDSI is to capture the extent of the use of Hydropower, which is a substitute for coal is the context
that power generating plants can use H2O to generate power instead of the use of coal. In months of
moisture, power generating plants will use less coal
and turn to water as a form of power generation. But,
in months of drought, plants will have no choice but
to use coal or other substitutes as a form of power
generation. Therefore, in periods of increased moisture and precipitation, the correlation between the
demand for permits and the drought index will be
negative. For the accurateness of this study the PDSI
values are used only for the Northeastern region, as
that is where the concentration of Hydropower is
used.
Temperature Index: The temperature index is an
index used to survey the average temperature of the
U.S. over time. The values were compiled from the
National Climatic Data Center (NOAA) and are
measured in Fahrenheit. The purpose of the tem-
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perature index is to capture the seasonal effects of
power generation. In colder months when more heat
is used, I predict that it will cost more energy as opposed to warmer months that will use less energy.
This underlying assumption is based on the Annual
Energy Cost report that states that consumers spend
more on heating than on cooling; thus I predict that
as average temperature increases, demand for SO2
prices will decrease and permit prices will be affected
negatively.

natural gas prices, U.S. Coal Price Index, and the
Drought Index were found to be significant at the
99% confidence interval. The unemployment rate,
temperature index, and SO2 allowance cap were all
found to be insignificant at the 90% confidence interval. However, except for the Temperature Index, all
of the coefficients of the variables have the expected
sign. The R-Squared came out to .543, indicating that
the variance of the dependent variable is relatively
appropriate for the statistical model. The variables
that were found to have the greatest impact on the
price of SO2 permits are the US natural gas prices,
drought index, and the US coal price index, respectively. Comparatively speaking, the results suggests
that a one dollar monthly increase in the price of
natural gas prices raises the SO2 allowance permits
price by 12.9%, a one dollar monthly increase in the
price of the US coal price index raises the SO2 permit prices by 2.1%, and a one unit monthly increase
in the drought index decreases the SO2 permit prices
by 6.8%.

SO2 Allowance Cap: The SO2 allowance cap is the
central figure for the supply of allowances. Every
year, the government sets a cap on how much SO2
emissions can be emitted, and that is the amount
available for supply in that specific year. The data values were obtained from the Environmental Protection Agency’s annual report and are defined as LOG
values. Due to the fact that the amount of allowance
permits do not change from month to month, the
values are compiled annually and are represented as
a constant value for each month in a given year. Since
the allowance cap determines the supply of SO2
In Model 2, the results are ultimately the
permits, I predict that, keeping all else constant, an
same with the exception that the dependent variable,
increase in supply will cause the price for SO2 perSO2 prices, is not in logarithmic form.
mits to fall.
In order to predict price movements of SO2
permit prices over time, I will be utilizing two regression analysis equations. My models are as follows:

Model 1 will be utilized to explain percentage effects that the price determinants will have on
the prices of SO2 allowance permits, barring their
significance. Model 2 will serve its purpose to predict
the average price of the SO2 permits and the effect
the price determinants will have on price movements
of SO2 permit prices.
VI. Results
In Model 1, the results of the market determinants are mixed. As shown in Table 1, the U.S.

Otherwise, Table 2 below shows that US natural gas prices, US coal prices, and the drought
index are the only significant variables, all at
the 99% confidence interval. Comparatively,
the results suggest that a one dollar monthly
increase in Real US natural gas prices increases SO2 permit prices by about 42.78 dollars,
a one dollar monthly increase in Real US coal
prices increases SO2 permit prices by about
9.58 dollars, and a one unit monthly increase
in the drought index decreases SO2 permit
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prices by about 16.20 dollars. The values derived in
this section are extremely telling because they will
help determine the effect to which movements in
their prices affect the price sensitivity of SO2 permit
prices.
In order to predict the average price of SO2
permits and to measure the price movements of SO2
permits as a result of the given price determinants, I
created Table 3. Simulation Results below that shows
the average price and the respective plus or minus
standard deviations from the mean of the significant
variables. To better understand the mathematical
process, the illustration of the three equations that
helped derive my values can be found in the Appendix.
Next, I used the mean values of each of the
independent variables (from the descriptive statistics
table below) and inserted them into my empirical
model and multiplied them with their respective
unstandardized beta coefficients to derive the average
SO2 price. The average predicted SO2 price came out
to $258.12. The standard deviated prices in Table 3.
Simulation Results represent the amount of dispersion from the mean and are compelling because they
quantify the extent to which each variable’s variation in price has on the predicted SO2 price. As US
natural gas prices and US coal prices increase relative
to the mean, the price of SO2 permits also increases.
This is due in large part to the idea that prices for
substitutes fuels increase because demand for substitute fuels is also increasing. As a result of increased
demand, production levels in those power generating
plants are also increasing. As supply of unused or unneeded permits attempts to match demand, the price
of permits will inevitably increase. The drought index, on the other hand, is a bit more complicated to
interpret. In Table 3 Simulation Results, the drought
index has the smallest effect in price variation of SO2
permits. However, that small underlying effect actually derives one of the greater meanings of its total
effect. In periods of time when there is increased
moisture and precipitation, hydropower plants capture the energy of falling water to generate electricity. A turbine converts the kinetic energy of falling
water into mechanical energy, and then a generator
converts the mechanical energy from the turbine into
electrical energy. This is a much more efficient way

of generating power and it releases much less SO2 in
the atmosphere. However, as already stated, this only
happens in times of rainfall. Therefore, although the
variable is highly significant, the effect of the drought
index is a small percent change. Looking back at
Table 1, we can see that as the drought index increases (increase in moisture and precipitation levels), this
reduces SO2 prices by 6.8%. Thus, as Hydropower
generating plants use more water as a more efficient
way of generating power, there is no need to buy up
more allowance permits, as hydropower is a more efficient alternative and does not create as much emissions.
VII. Conclusion
The Acid Rain Program is the oldest and
most storied cap and trade program in U.S. history.
The application of a market system within the program is proven to have positive environmental and
economic effects. From my research, I found that
changes in U.S. natural gas prices, U.S. coal prices,
and the drought index have the largest effects on
the price of SO2 allowance permits; and although
my empirical model contains different variables
than have been measured in the past with other
research studies, I believe that there is merit to the
results of my price determinants. The fact that 5 of
6 signs on the coefficients of my variables came out
as expected gives confidence to continue furthering
these research efforts. Nonetheless, the effect of the
temperature index and the SO2 cap yielded disappointing results, and is a further application that
should be explored deeper. Although in my initial
stages I believed that temperature was going to be
of great importance to capture the effect of seasonable variations on production levels, I quickly found
out that it was not. The SO2 cap is another variable
that I believed would play a major role as it is my
central supply figure in my theoretical supply and
demand model for allowance permits, but it too did
not produce the results I had hoped for. In extended
research I suggest trying to find a way to capture the
effect of both of these variables because in reality,
they carry great weight in determining the prices for
SO2 permits. Under the circumstances that these
price determinants all have a significant effect on
permit prices, a derived policy implication could be
used in developing countries to reduce the industrial
output of sulfur dioxide.
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In an attempt to discover a way to reduce
the effects of sulfuric acid in the atmosphere, a
groundbreaking concept was born that provided
an efficient and cost-effective way to reduce the
emissions and also created an incentive for firms
to participate in the process. With decreased levels
of sulfuric acid in the atmosphere and with both
phase I and phase II decreasing SO2 emissions by
57% and 14% respectively since 2000, the success of
this program exceeding initial expectations.
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